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Abstract—Android malware detection represents a current and
complex problem, where black hats use different methods to
infect users’ devices. One of these methods consists in directly
upload malicious applications to app stores, whose filters are not
always successful at detecting malware, entrusting the final user
the decision of whether installing or not an application. Although
there exist different solutions for analysing and detecting Android
malware, these systems are far from being sufficiently precise,
requiring the use of third-party antivirus software which is not
always simple to use and practical. In this paper, we propose
a novel method called ADROIT for analysing and detecting
malicious Android applications by employing meta-information
available on the app store website and also in the Android
Manifest. Its main objective is to provide a fast but also accurate
tool able to assist users to avoid their devices to become infected
without even requiring to install the application to perform the
analysis. The method is mainly based on a text mining process
that is used to extract significant information from meta-data,
that later is used to build efficient and highly accurate classifiers.
The results delivered by the experiments performed prove the
reliability of ADROIT, showing that it is capable of classifying
malicious applications with 93.67% accuracy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Malware threats are present in almost all software architec-
tures from devices firmware to super-computers. Smart devices
are not an exception. Currently, the growing market of mobile
apps is opening a new spreading door where black hats are able
to steal critical information from users, attacking their all-day
devices. Android is now the main target for these attacks, and
its markets have become a sensitive bridge where black hats
aim to introduce their malicious apps to get control over users
mobiles. The security of these markets is critical, in order to
avoid global infections and to guarantee the devices safeness.
Unfortunately, current markets, excluding Google Play
Store, are performing low control services to avoid infections,
leaving that responsibility to the final user [1], [2]. The
user has to decide, based on the information provided by
the online application store, whether they have confidence
to install the app or not. Although there are different tools
which can be used, mainly antivirus software, to analyse
and extract information from applications and classify them
between benign or malicious, these solutions are not prompt
nor fully effective. They force the user to install a very
resource intensive application in their devices to analyse the
suspicious applications, which has also to be installed in order
to perform the analysis. Considering this scenario, this work
aims to provide a fast and accurate tool for detecting Android
malware leveraging meta-information which can be extracted
directly from the online app store and also in the Android
Manifest. We combine and apply text mining and classification
techniques on this information to assist the user in the decision,
whether the application is reliable and it can be installed safely
or when there are malicious indications which advise against
installing.
Based on Gorla et al. [3] work, ADROIT aims towards
providing an up-to-date and improved contribution, limiting
the analysis to meta-information instead of performing soft-
ware analysis, as the former authors did (which complicates
and slows the analysis). This allows to build an easy-to-use
technology while ensuring high accuracy, due to a wide and
representative selection of features. This methodology can also
help to feed recommender systems to assist the user during the
decision process. Furthermore, we have also chosen supervised
learning for this approach in order to improve the classification
quality.
The main contributions of this paper are:
• An up-to-day analysis of Aptoide market, one of the most
important alternative applications stores under which sev-
eral markets are grouped, choosing randomly a represen-
tative sample of more than 9,000 apps to measure the
security for the final user.
• A text mining analysis combining different meta-data
information to generate a classifier which can assist users
in their final decisions. The classifier obtains 93.67%
of accuracy improving the state-of-the-art techniques
and overcoming commercial Anti-Virus engines, as we
demonstrate in the experiments sections.
• A technique that can easily be extended to any app
market, including iOS and Windows markets, due to the
independence from the application software.
The paper is structured as follows: next section explains
the methodologies applied; after, Section 3 introduces the
experimental setup which is applied for the experiments of
Section 4. Then, next section introduces the related work.
Finally, the last section details the conclusions and future
work.
II. ANDROID MALWARE DETECTION USING
META-INFORMATION
This section describes ADROIT, a novel malware detection
method based on meta-information available in the app store
and in the Android Manifest file. The objectives of ADROIT
consist on providing a fast and reliable tool to help users when
they make the decision of installing an application in their
personal devices, discouraging this action when there are signs
which call into doubt its real intentions. ADROIT is built in
a step by a step approach as it is shown in Figure 1.
First of all, a representative set of samples was gathered
with applications downloaded from Aptoide, an online app
store. All these samples were analysed with a pool of different
antivirus engines, allowing to verify the existence of malware
in this store and generating a labelled dataset of benign and
malicious Android applications. Together with the application
itself, it was also downloaded diverse meta-information, later
used to train and test different machine learning classification
algorithms. This information includes the minimum SDK and
OpenGL versions required to run the application, the minimum
size of the screen and the supported CPU types of the Android
device, an identification of the developer, its organisation, the
locality and the country, the rating score given by the users,
the number of users who voted and a description, where the
developer use to describe what is the application about and
define its purposes. Although it is possible to retrieve a list
of permissions from the app store, this list is not reliable.
After comparing it with the permissions written in the Android
Manifest, it was discovered that many virus writers provide a
fake list to the app store with the aim of confusing the user,
as it is explained in the Experimental Setup section.
The method proposed performs a static analysis using all
this meta-information with the ultimate goal of providing a
fast tool to detect if an application is suspected to contain
malicious code. Each piece of meta-information provides a
valuable instrument to detect evidences, patterns or traces
linked to apps considered as malware. For example, the rating
score allows to make a decision based on the opinion of
users who have already used the application. It is also useful
the description, in order to discover techniques used by virus
writers to confuse the user or other patterns that may reflect
differences in comparison with benign-ware. The developer,
organisation, locality or the country allows to find relations
which can be used to disclose sectors closely linked to a
particular kind of applications. Finally, the list of permissions
allows to incorporate a useful definition of the behaviour of
the application, enabling to find groups or relations mostly
associated to a specific label.
A. Natural Language Processing
The description of the app needs special care, because it
contains semantic information. In order to include the meta-
information provided by the description inside our classi-
fication model we have used Text Mining techniques. The
technique followed is based on the classical term-document
matrix where each description is considered as a document
and a set of terms is extracted from the whole description
corpus. These terms are chosen after a cleaning process which
eliminates those terms that are not relevant, and uniforms those
terms that have similar roots. This process is divided in the
following steps:
• Remove special characters: All irrelevant characters (such
as numbers, exclamation, symbols, etc), are eliminated.
• Remove stopwords: those words which are normally used
to connect sentences or words.
• Stemming: Reduces words to the word stem, i.e., to a root
form where affixes can be attached.
• Strip white spaces: if it is found an space inside a word
after applying the previous steps, it is also removed.
After the cleaning process the corpus is transformed into
a term-document matrix, and normalised using TF-IDF nor-
malisation. In addition, those terms with a sparsity above a
specific threshold are removed.
Finally, this matrix is combined with the rest of meta-
information available in the online app store, considering them
as categorical data and translating it to a boolean matrix
(excepted rating, number of votes and minimum OpenGL and
SDK versions, which are kept as numeric values).
This matrix is also combined with the list of permissions
defined in the Android Manifest, where each new features
indicates the declaration or not of a specific permission. The
use of this information allows to include more accurate data
which has not been modified to confuse the user, in contrast
to the meta-information available in the app store.
Once it is defined the search space, it is possible to
apply different classifiers to distinguish between malware and
benign-ware. The following section describes the classifiers.
B. Classification
The classification process is based on discriminating mal-
ware and benign-ware using a learning process which aims
to identify patterns from different permission policies and
instructions used. In this case, we consider two labels: malware



























Fig. 1: Diagram of the step-by-step process to build a classifier in ADROIT
to learn the main differences among them. The following
classifiers have been selected in order to perform this task1:
• Random Forest (RF): It is a hybrid method that in-
corporates the advantages of combining different tree
classifiers. This methodology trains several decision trees
and assigns a confidence value to each one, creating a
voting system. This confidence value is used to reach
an agreement between the different tree classifiers [4]. It
helps to determine when there are sections that are not
totally linear.
• k-Nearest Neighbours (kNN): The Nearest Neighbours
algorithm assign a new class to an instance according to
the k closest neighbours.
• Decision Trees (DT): It divides the data linearly using
limits in the attributes and generates a decision tree. The
division is chosen using a metric, in this case, the data
entropy [5]. The specific algorithm used is SCART, a
modification of the C4.5 algorithm.
• AdaBoost (AB) It is a multi-learners approach that com-
bines weak classifiers through a weight voting system, in
order to ensure that they can complement each other. The
weights are learned by the algorithm during the training
process.
• Bagging (B) This methodology combines different clas-
sifiers choosing random subsets from the space and
feeding the classifiers with them. The chosen classifiers
are Decision Trees classifiers.
• Naı¨ve bayes (NB): Naı¨ve Bayes (NB) is based on
Bayes Probability Laws and considers each feature in-
dependently from the rest [6] and contributing to the
information modelling. This helps to understand when
the features are independent or they need to complement
their information with another feature.
III. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
This section introduces the data and algorithms that have
been applied for this study, specially the parameters and
validation metrics used during the experiments.
1The implementation of the classifiers can be found in http://scikit-learn.
org/stable/
A. Dataset
Currently, there are several app stores enabling users to
download applications to their devices. Although they claim
that every available application has passed through a full scan
to detect if it contains malicious components, it has been
proved that many applications are able to bypass these filters
and finish being published. We have gathered a set of 12,360
applications downloaded from the Aptoide2 app store. Then,
we analysed each of them using the API provided by the
VirusTotal3 online portal, which allows to analyse applications
or documents with 56 different antivirus engines. For more
than the 38% of the samples, at least one antivirus tested for
positive. This figure notes the need to take precautions when
downloading and installing new applications, even when they
are obtained from sites qualified as safe.
These 12,360 apps extracted from the Aptoide market4
were used to test our model. In order to generate a ground
truth about the software nature, the results obtained from
the VirusTotal website were used to label all the samples.
We considered that an app is malware when a single Anti-
Virus produces a positive detection. From all these application,
VirusTotal detected 4,799 apps as malware, while the rest of
samples were categorised as benign-ware by all the Anti-virus
engines5.
Together with the application executable file, we took all the
meta-information information previously described, including
the description, the developer or the rating score. After an
overall analysis, it was found that an important number of the
samples did not have a description, forcing to remove all these
applications from the dataset and decreasing its size to 2,426
malicious and 6,704 benign applications.
B. Text Mining
The text preprocessing step for each application aims to
obtain a set of relevant terms that can be used to represent them
and distinguish between malicious versus benign applications.
This Text Mining process was addressed using the Text Mining




5The extraction and analysis date was done on June 2016.
6https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/tm
Malware Benignware
Samples where permissions informed
in website differs from Manifest
73.32% 37.03%
Average number of permissions informed in
app store website but not declared in Manifest
7.58 2.25
Average number of permissions informed
in Manifest not declared in app store
9.90 9.63
TABLE I: Differences in Android permissions declaration
found in Android Manifest and app store
applying different filters, it is needed to find a subset of
words representative of different behavioural patterns. The
RemoveSparse function allows to remove those terms which
are only part of a low number of samples and hardly to be
useful to discover these patterns. This function receives a
parameter in charge of establishing a limit to dispersed terms
included. Given the importance of this parameter, which is
closely linked to the granularity level of the system, but also to
its generalisation ability on new data, different values ranging
from 0.95 to 0.999 were tested.
C. Android permissions
When developing an Android application, it is needed to
indicate in the Android Manifest a series of permissions
required to run the app. They allow the application to access
certain operating system and terminal functions and are a
means of increasing the security. They also enable to extract an
overall picture of its behavioural model based on the actions
expected to be performed at run-time. These permissions are
provided to the user in the app store website, as well as other
information such as the minimum required SDK version or
the description of the application. Although the information
displayed should be consistent with the Android Manifest, this
is not always the case.
In order to analyse and discover possible differences be-
tween both information sources, the app store website and
the Android manifest, they were compared separately for all
the benign and malicious applications gathered from Aptoide.
Table I summarises the results obtained. There are clear
differences between malware and benign-ware. While 37% of
the second ones showed differences between the permissions
declared in the Manifest and in the app store, in the case of
malware this figure rises to 73% of the samples. It is also
worth noting the specific distribution between the differences
found in malware and benign samples, where there can be
permissions declared in the Android Manifest, but not in the
app store website or, in contrast, permissions declared in the
app store but missing in the Manifest. Regarding the first
group, there is a very remarkable trend, showing that virus-
writers use to report many permissions which are later not
implemented. The reasons for this could lie in the intention
of black-hats of showing fictitious intentions to hide the real
purposes (as a Trojan horse).
On the other hand, within the range of applications reporting
an incomplete list of permissions to the app store, there is a
similar trend for both kinds of applications, where close to
9.5% of the samples exhibit discrepancies. Although this is
an unexpected behaviour, it can be attributed to an intentional
omission of particular permissions by the app store. Due to this
divergence between the permissions declared in the Android
Manifest and on the app store website, we have selected the
Manifest as a more reliable source of information, since it is
the document actually used by the operating system to allow
the application execution.
D. Classification
The classification algorithms applied in this study were
executed using the scikit-learn7 library for Python. Each
classification algorithm was executed 20 times with a different
random initialisation for each configuration evaluated. In order
to measure the quality of each model, the data was divided
into a training and a testing dataset, at a rate of 2/3 and 1/3
respectively. The specific classification algorithms used are the
following:
• Random Forest: fixing the number of internal decision
trees to 100.
• Nearest Neighbors: keeping default settings.
• Decision Tree: keeping default settings.
• AdaBoost: keeping default settings.
• Naive Bayes: keeping default settings.
• Bagging: using Random Forest as individual classifier
and fixing the number of decision trees to 100.




TP + TN + FP + FN
, (1)
which allow us to compare the current results with Gorla
et al. results [3]. Furthermore, we have also built the ROC
curve for different configurations in order to assess the false
positives and true positives ratios.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
This section shows the final experiments performed during
the detection process. First, we focus the analysis on the
classification accuracy. After, we perform an study of the ROC
curve in order to evaluate what classifier can be more suitable
to reduce false positives. Finally, we compare our detection
methodology with commercial antivirus and another method
with a similar approach.
A. Accuracy Results
Each classification algorithm run 20 times for different
number of terms used in the text-mining step (according to
the parameter of the RemoveSparse function). The results are
shown in Fig. 2, where Naive Bayes and Nearest Neighbours
have been omitted for better visualisation, since any of them
exceeded a 80% accuracy at no observed point. The remaining
four classifiers also indicate important differences between
them. While RandomForest and Bagging have a very similar
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Fig. 3: ROC curve for the different classification algorithms tested
Comparing RandomForest with a Bagging algorithm, the
former is able to slightly increase the accuracy for most of
the sizes of the term-document matrix tested. In terms of
deviation, Decision Tree produces very different solutions,
while Random Forest and Bagging produce solutions closed
to the average. The best result, a 93.67% accuracy, is achieved
using a Random Forest classifier and 575 terms (applying a
parameter of 0.98 in the remove sparse function).
The number of terms used to include the information
provided by the description of the application, 575 different
words, can be considered as a large figure, denoting that it is
needed a deep enough granularity level to benefit from this
information. However, a larger number of points contributes
negatively, by entering unnecessary data to the model and
causing accuracy to drop slightly. In general, the accuracy
level achieved can be considered as high, arising close to 94%
accuracy without requiring a dynamic analysis and just using
information retrieved from the app store website and from the
Android Manifest.
B. ROC study
While the accuracy is a reliable information source to
measure the quality of a classifier, the false positive rate is also
a key when designing malware detection methods, because of
its link with the proper system operation. Fig. 3 shows the
ROC curve for the six classification algorithms tested. Once
again, Naive Bayes and Nearest Neighbours yield the worst
results with the smaller AUC (Area Under the Curve). Random
Forest and Bagging produce almost identical results, with
94% and 94.04% AUC sizes respectively. As it can be seen,










TABLE III: Accuracy reached with different commercial an-
tivirus engines, the CHABADA method and the ADROIT
level, Bagging produces a larger Area Under the Curve or, in
other words, a better balance between true positives and false
positives rates.
For best understanding of the ROC curves generated by the
different classifiers, Table II shows the maximum true positive
ratio achieved (depending on the cut-off value used) according
to different false positive rates accepted. With the aim of
minimising the false positive rate, Bagging is the best option,
reaching an 86% accuracy with only 10% of False Positives. In
contrast, when the objective is to reach the highest true positive
rate, it is possible to arise 100 per cent using a Decision Tree
classifier while producing 50% of False Positives. These values
show that it is possible to configure the algorithm to give
greater emphasis to a specific parameter. The final decision
will depend on the user’s decision.
C. Results comparison
ADROIT aims to provide a fast tool to analyse and deter-
mine the nature of an Android applications without compro-
mising the accuracy. The meta-information, the permissions,
as well as the text mining step, allow to build a strong classifier
able to compete and to overcome commercial antivirus engines
and also CHABADA, a similar approach to ADROIT but
where the authors use clustering techniques. The results,
displayed in Table III, show that ADROIT is able to overcome
the accuracy levels achieved by the rest of methods tested by
more than 8%.
Based on these results, in can be asserted that the meta-
information accompanying each application offers a powerful
resource to train accurate classification models able to distin-
guish between malicious and benign applications. This means
that the description or a permission policy specific definition
provide significant details about the nature of an Android
application.
V. RELATED WORK
This section introduces the related work based on three main
points of view which are combined in this work: Android apps
analysis, malware analysis and text mining techniques.
a) Android analysis: Android has become a famous OS
for smart devices over the last few years. This OS covers
from mobile phones, to tablets or to TV devices among
others. There are several research lines focused on Android
app analysis, specially on understanding the market behaviour
[7], development decision [8], app testing [9] and prediction
models to detect markets tendencies [10]. The work developed
by Gorla et al. [3], which inspires this work, was focused
on detecting anomalies in the market, based on the different
categories where the apps can be distributed. Using this
anomaly detector, authors where able to detect malware, but
with a high false positive ratio. This work aims to continue
this strategy focusing only on those features that are easy to
extract, instead of performing an API calls analysis, which is
normally not available to the final users.
b) Malware analysis: The analysis of Android malware
is contextualised in the malware Arms Race. From the be-
ginning of computer science, malware has been developed in
order to attack system vulnerabilities with a wide range of
malicious goals in mind [11]. These harmful attacks, originally
promoted by single individuals and currently promoted by
strong organisations, are usually counteract by white hats,
which are usually single individuals, researchers or small
organisations [12].
There are several ways for detecting malware, which are
categorised from a software analysis point of view as dynamic
and static analysis.
On the one hand, static analysis aims to analyse malware
using only the information provided by the program itself
[13]. This is usually performed by a disassembly or decompi-
lation process which recovers the program instructions and
the Control Flow Graph. Using this information, different
strategies, such as symbolic execution [14], opcode analysis
[15] or control flow graph analysis [16] can be used to detect
and understand malware behaviour. In Android systems, we
can find static analysis examples like CHABADA [3] which
extract API calls from the apps, the work of Schmidt et al.
[13] which define a collaborative framework to share static
analysis features between different systems, MOCDroid [17],
which uses genetic algorithms or the work of Yerime et al.
[18], where authors combine static features with Bayesian
classifiers.
On the other hand, dynamic analysis is focused on malware
execution and aims to understand its behaviour, studying the
traces it leaves in the systems [19], such as memory access
[20], network communications [21], and registers modifica-
tions [22], among others. This information creates a signature
used for the detection and discrimination processes. Some
examples of dynamic analysis in Android environments are
CopperDroid [23], which reconstructs the behaviour of an app,
DREBIN [24], which combines dynamic features with clas-
sification and ALTERDROID [25], which detects obfuscated
components from behavioural traces.
In this work we only focus on the meta-information
recorded by the market, enabling to make a fast but also
detailed analysis through the large number of features available
in the app store, such as the developer identification or a
description of the application. All this information is processed
using text mining and machine learning classifiers to develop
a system able to categorise Android applications between
benign and malicious depending on the existence of certain
patterns. While most of the features employed to train a
Classifier
False Positive rate
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Bagging 0 0.86 0.89 0.91 0.94 0.96 0.98 0.99 1 1 1
Random Forest 0 0.85 0.88 0.91 0.93 0.95 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.99 1
Decision Tree 0 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 1 1 1 1 1 1
Naive Bayes 0 0.73 0.75 0.82 0.87 0.89 0.89 0.89 1 1 1
AdaBoost 0 0.55 0.87 0.90 0.92 0.95 0.97 0.98 0.99 1 1
Nearest Neighbours 0 0.38 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.80 0.83 0.84 1 1 1
TABLE II: True Positive ratios according to different False Positive ratios
classification algorithm can be used as polynomial attributes,
the description of an application is formed by texts of different
length providing raw information. The use of Text Mining
techniques allows to extract relevant data from these texts.
c) Text Mining: Text Mining is one of the most rele-
vant subfields of Natural Language Processing [26] specially
focused on topic detection and extraction [26], sentiment
analysis [26] and recommender systems [27], among others.
These techniques are based on finding similarities among
documents and topics based on semantic features extracted
from their used [27]. Using these features as basic knowledge,
machine learning algorithms leverage them to generate high-
level abstraction models [27]. These models can be applied to
document classification [27], trending detection [26], etc. In
this work we take advantage of this combination to generate
a detection system for malicious apps, mainly based on
understanding the descriptions language and the app meta-
information.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This work has presented a text mining and machine learning
approach to detect malicious apps in a well-known Android
market, Aptoide. The combination of these two techniques is
applied over the meta-information extracted from the market
website and the Android Manifest, which includes developer
data, the permissions or the description of the application,
where a text mining operation is in charge of extracting
relevant information. The final model, called ADROIT, use
all this information to train a machine learning classification
algorithm able to reach accuracy rates close to 94%. One
of the strengths and contributions of this paper is related to
the employment of simple text mining techniques that allows
to generate highly accurate results. Our future work involves
applying and testing ADROIT in other app stores, as it can
be Google Play Store, increasing the accuracy by crossing
information of the same application in different app stores or
incorporating further meta-information.
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